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CREATING A SYSTEM FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION:
HOW THE NONPROFIT SECTOR CAN PROVIDE
CITIZENS A VOICE IN TOKYO’S URBAN
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM
Nicolas J. Vikstrom†
Abstract: Recent changes in Japan’s civil society together with the current
political and economic environment have created the first opportunity to develop a viable
nonprofit sector that represents citizen interests and allows for public participation in
Tokyo’s urban development scheme. Tokyo’s urban environment has failed to meet the
social and cultural needs of its citizens due to unprecedented economic and industrial
growth from the beginning of the Meiji era until the 1990s. Through this extended period
of growth, the goal for urban development was solely to increase Tokyo’s economic
strength, while social needs were not addressed. While the City Planning Law of 1968
(“CPL”) sought to require citizen participation in urban planning, the law was largely
ineffective due to its narrow scope and weak legal remedies. During much of the
twentieth century, Tokyo’s governance was controlled by an iron triangle comprised of
bureaucracy, government, and big business, which drove Tokyo’s economic growth. This
form of governance did not allow citizens to participate in the political process. The iron
triangle lost its strength only after the collapse of the economic bubble in the 1990s.
With urban development failing to meet the needs of the citizens and the iron triangle
having lost its strength, citizens groups began to assert more influence over the city’s
governance. Successes for the citizens groups and growing media attention prompted the
promulgation of the Nonprofit Organizations Law of 1998 (“NPO Law”). The NPO Law
created a framework for a nonprofit sector and began to strengthen its legitimacy. Unlike
past attempts to introduce a viable nonprofit sector, the NPO Law came at a time when
the political and economic environments of the city allowed for outside influence in the
political process. While the foundation has now been laid for a viable nonprofit sector,
the sector must gain legitimacy and independence before it is a truly viable means to
public participation. With increased legitimacy and independence, Japan’s nonprofit
sector will serve to improve the urban development scheme by balancing the interests of
citizens and corporations and meet long-standing social goals.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Residents of Kunitachi, a suburb west of Tokyo, are proud of the
roadside trees and stylish street lights along Daigaku Dori (University
Avenue).1 The town is known as a college town and has attracted famous
writers, painters, and sculptors who are fond of the town’s sakura (cherry

†
The author would like to thank the diligent and hard-working members of the Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal and Professor Veronica Taylor for their insight, assistance, and editorial advice. The author
also wishes to thank his friends and family for their support and patience throughout the writing process.
Any errors or omissions are the author's own.
1
Kunitachi City, available at http://members.tripod.com/~callstudy/Kunitachi/Kunitachi.html (last
visited Nov. 17, 2005).
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blossom) lined streets.2 These are the avenues that often appear in television
love stories.3 These same streets are also threatened by Tokyo’s prevailing
goal of economic growth and development, and citizens have little power to
influence future urban development.
The consequences of Tokyo’s economic focus have recently reached
Japan’s courts in a case involving the Kunitachi section of western Tokyo.4
The case involves a condominium complex in Kunitachi’s scenic district that
for decades had a voluntary height restriction of twenty meters. 5 A
developer, Meiwa Estate Co. (“Meiwa”), purchased the land and sought to
build a forty-three-meter-tall building on the scenic avenue. 6 Concerned
citizens brought suit against Meiwa to prevent construction of the
condominium complex, arguing that it destroyed scenery along University
Avenue. 7 Specifically, the residents claimed that the apartment complex
“seriously violated their rights to scenery and sunlight, and created a strong
feeling of oppression among the residents.”8 In a landmark decision, a three
judge panel of the Tokyo District Court found in favor of the plaintiffs,
ordering Meiwa to remove the top twenty-three meters of the forty-threemeter building.9 Judge Akira Miyaoka stated, “The condominium violates
the local residents’ rights to scenery.”10 Meiwa argued that they acted within
the legal restrictions for the site, which did not include a mandatory height
restriction.11 On appeal, the Tokyo High Court overruled the lower court,
finding that Meiwa was within the municipal code in force at the time of
construction.12 The Court stated, “Beautiful scenery is a mutual asset that
benefits all people and residents. But this does not mean that individual
residents can claim private rights to enjoy the scenery.”13 The citizens have
indicated their intent to immediately appeal the decision to the Japanese
Supreme Court.14 Without changing the urban development system, citizens
2

Id.
Id.
Court Orders Complex to Lose Seven Floors, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 19, 2002,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/makeprfy.pl5?nn20021219a1.htm.
5
Yumi Wijers-Hasegawa, Judge Reverses Kunitachi Ruling, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2004,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/news/nn10-2004/nn20041028a3.htm.
6
Appeal Court Rules Kunitachi High-Rise Condominium Legal, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Jun. 7,
2002, at 8.
7
Wijers-Hasegawa, supra note 5.
8
Id.
9
Court Orders Complex to Lose Seven Floors, supra note 4.
10
Id.
11
Wijers-Hasegawa, supra note 5.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
3
4
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have no means to effectively participate in decisions affecting the
development of their urban environment.
Citizen participation15 in the urban development of Tokyo has been
limited from the beginning of the Meiji era in 1868.16 The highly centralized
and paternalistic government17 allowed for rapid growth as well as efficient
and effective redevelopment18 in the face of massive urban destruction in the
beginning of the nineteenth century.19 The preeminent goals for Tokyo from
the end of the nineteenth century to the early 1990s were industrial and
economic growth. 20 These goals did not allow for effective citizen
participation.21 Following the destruction of the Great Kantō Earthquake
and World War II until the 1960s, however, Tokyo citizens largely believed
that economic and industrial recovery needed to take precedence over sociocultural goals.22 It was not until the citizens’ movements of the 1960s that
pressure was applied to change the urban development structure.
Pressure for increased citizen participation in the urban development
system began to grow in the 1960s,23 but Tokyo’s political and economic
environment prevented significant changes to the system.24 The result of the
successful redevelopment of Tokyo after World War II was a strong political
iron triangle comprised of government, bureaucracy, and big business.25 The
15
“Citizen participation,” “citizen involvement,” and “public participation” are used interchangeably
and are used here in their most general sense. The terms include any activity, organized, independent, or
otherwise, in which private citizens provide input to the political or administrative process of urban
development. Common forms of citizen participation include, but are not limited to, participating in public
hearings, commenting on development projects, and participating in groups such as neighborhood
associations or other interest groups.
16
ANDRÉ SORENSEN, THE MAKING OF URBAN JAPAN: CITIES AND PLANNING FROM EDO TO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 54 (2002). “The role of government was to strengthen the country while the role
of the people was to serve the emperor. . . . Little political space was left for the development of
independent conceptions of the public good, or for activities that might support them.” Id.
17
Id. at 52-54.
18
See id. at 178-83.
19
The destruction caused by the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923 and by World War II is discussed
infra Part II.B.
20
SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 178.
21
Id. at 208.
22
The term “socio-cultural goals” will be used to describe, in general, the largely intangible goals
that a community holds to improve the livability of their local environment. Common goals included
within this category are the desire for green spaces, access to air and light, convenient access to everyday
needs such as grocery stores, a clean environment, reliable transportation, efficient roads, and access to
public transportation. This list of goals serves simply to aid in the understanding of the term “sociocultural goals”; it is by no means an inclusive list and many of the goals may also fit within the desired
goals for other objectives such as economic growth.
23
See generally ROMAN CYBRIWSKY, TOKYO: THE CHANGING PROFILE OF AN URBAN GIANT 93-97
(1991) (discussing Tokyo’s urban problems in the 1960s and 70s).
24
See generally Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the “Developmental State”? Administrative Procedure
Reform in Japan and Korea, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585 (2001).
25
Id. at 589.
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iron triangle governance prevented individuals from affecting change in the
urban development. Furthermore, the legal structure in Japan made it
difficult for nonprofit organizations (“NPOs”) 26 to form or function. 27
Citizen participation gained a few small footholds at this time. Although the
City Planning Law of 1968 required citizen consent in urban development
projects,28 and a few small judicial victories gave citizens some influence
over the urban development system, 29 these victories did not eclipse the
strength and influence of the iron triangle and citizen participation remained
limited.
The first major steps toward allowing citizen participation in the urban
development system came in the early 1990s. The collapse of the economic
bubble reduced the strength of the iron triangle and allowed citizen groups to
assert more effective influence over the Tokyo government. 30 The Kobe
earthquake of 1995 was also an effective catalyst for NPOs, bringing
attention both to the effectiveness of NPOs and to the ineffectiveness of the
government in response to the earthquake.31 The weakened political iron
triangle, paired with the favorable media attention for the nonprofit sector,
allowed for the hasty passage of the Nonprofit Organizations Law of 1998
(“NPO Law”).32
The promulgation of the NPO Law created the first viable framework
for citizen participation in the urban development system in Tokyo. In order
to move from a framework for citizen participation to actual participation,
the nonprofit sector must first gain legitimacy and independence.33 Gaining
local constituent support and improving the reputation of the NPOs in local
26
References to the nonprofit sector and nonprofit organizations (“NPOs”) are to organizations
formed for the good of the general public. As the terms are generally recognized in Japan, NPOs refer to
domestic organizations, working in the interests of Japan’s citizens and does not include international aid
organizations that are referred to as nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”). Unless otherwise noted,
this Comment does not distinguish between organizations organized under the NPO Law of 1998 and those
not formally organized.
27
See generally Takako Amemiya, The Nonprofit Sector: Legal Background, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR IN JAPAN 59-98 (Tadashi Yamamoto ed., 1998).
28
See Byron Shibata, Development Procedure Law in Japan: Its Operation and Effects on Law and
Economy, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 149 (2003) [hereinafter Shibata 2003]. See generally Byron Shibata,
Land Use Law in the United States and Japan: A Fundamental Overview and Comparative Analysis, 10
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 161 (2002) [hereinafter Shibata 2002].
29
SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 210.
30
Id. at 296-97.
31
See generally Makoto Imada, The Voluntary Response to the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake: A
Trigger for the Development of the Voluntary and Non-Profit Sector in Japan, in THE VOLUNTARY AND
NON-PROFIT SECTOR IN JAPAN 40-50 (Stephen P. Osborne ed., 2003).
32
Robert Pekkanen, The Politics of Regulating the Non-Profit Sector, in THE VOLUNTARY AND NONPROFIT SECTOR IN JAPAN 53-75 (Stephen P. Osborne ed., 2003).
33
See infra Part V.C.
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communities will improve NPO legitimacy. 34 Building a sound financial
base independent from government funding will allow NPOs to gain
independence. 35 To bring this about, the tax structure of NPOs must be
changed; there must be tax incentives for people to contribute to NPOs.36
With the respect of the community and the ability to act independently from
the government, the nonprofit sector would have the opportunity to
effectively represent the interests of Tokyo citizens.
This Comment argues that the recently developed framework for a
nonprofit sector representing the interests of the citizens of Tokyo embodies
the first viable means of meeting the socio-cultural goals for urban
development. Part II discusses the modern historical development of urban
planning in Tokyo and describes the political and economical forces that
have shaped urban development and planning. Part III explains Tokyo’s
previous attempts to introduce citizen participation into the urban
development scheme as well as the impediments to these early attempts.
Part IV analyzes Tokyo’s goals for urban development and why many of
these goals have not been successfully implemented. Finally, Part V argues
that the recent emergence of a framework for a nonprofit sector in Japan can
meet Tokyo’s goals for urban development.
II.

TO RECOVER FROM THE DISASTERS OF THE EARLY TWENTIETH
CENTURY, JAPAN ENFORCED A HIGHLY CENTRALIZED URBAN
DEVELOPMENT SCHEME THAT EMPHASIZED ECONOMIC GROWTH

The repeated destruction of Tokyo in the early twentieth century
shaped the city’s urban development scheme and created tension between
the necessities created by wartime ruin and the socio-cultural needs of its
citizens. Despite its history of destruction, Tokyo quickly and capably
recovered from the disasters. 37 The key to this success was the hypercentralized governance that emphasized economic growth.38 The price of
this success was an absence of citizen participation in the urban development
scheme, resulting in citizens becoming disconnected from a “town” they
once knew. 39 Post-war Tokyo was a place for economic prosperity and
decidedly not a place for emphasizing the needs of the citizens.
34
Robert O. Bothwell, The Challenges of Growing the NPO and Voluntary Sector in Japan, in THE
VOLUNTARY AND NON-PROFIT SECTOR IN JAPAN 129-33 (Stephen P. Osborne ed., 2003).
35
Id. at 137-39.
36
Id. at 145.
37
See infra Part II.C.
38
Id.
39
Id.
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The Meiji Period Resulted in Rapid Urban and Industrial
Development, but Failed to Incorporate Citizen Participation

The story of Tokyo’s urban development begins largely with the fall
of the Shogun and restoration of imperial rule in 1868.40 This era, termed
Meiji or “enlightened rule,” had a particularly strong impact on Tokyo’s
urban development. 41 Shortly before the beginning of the Meiji era, the
United States entered Japan to open trade relations, effectively ending 250
years of Japanese isolation.42 Japanese ports became open to both foreign
trade and the exchange of ideas. 43 In 1868, Tokyo became the imperial
capital. The imperial government set a goal of modernizing Tokyo
physically and culturally under the Western influence.44 It was in the Meiji
period that Tokyo began to emerge as an industrial center in Japan. With
heavy government and private investment in industry and factory
production, Tokyo became Japan’s leading manufacturing city.45 The Meiji
period saw Tokyo’s population boom, 46 vast improvements in urban
infrastructure, and tremendous downtown growth, as well as increasing
cultural opportunities for the citizens.47
B.

The Great Kantō Earthquake and World War II Devastated Tokyo, but
Provided an Opportunity to Properly Redevelop the City

The period of growth and prosperity of the Meiji era came to an
abrupt end in 1923 with the Great Kantō Earthquake, which struck just off
the shore of Tokyo in Sagami Bay (“the Great Quake”).48 The Great Quake
devastated the city, toppling buildings, and sparking scores of fires and a fire
storm that in turn triggered cyclones and other weather patterns that killed
tens of thousands more citizens.49 All told, over 100,000 citizens perished
and seventy-three percent of the houses in Tokyo were damaged or
destroyed.50
40

CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 62.
Id. at 63.
42
Id. at 62.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 63.
45
Id. at 72.
46
The population of Tokyo grew from 600,000 at the time of the Meiji restoration in 1868 to 2.2
million at the end of the era. Michael Wegener, Tokyo’s Land Market and its Impact on Housing and
Urban Life, in PLANNING FOR CITIES AND REGIONS IN JAPAN 93 (Philip Shapira, Ian Masser & David W.
Edgington eds., 1994).
47
CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 76.
48
Id. at 78.
49
Id. at 78-81.
50
Id. at 80.
41

FEBRUARY 2006

CREATING A SYSTEM FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

337

Prior to the Great Quake, Tokyo had plans to redevelop its heavily
industrialized city to better meet the needs of its citizens.51 Gōtō Shimpei, former
mayor of Tokyo, researched how to redevelop and address the needs of the growing
city. 52 Gōtō sought input from leading American planners and established the
Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research (“the Institute”) in order to meet his
planning goals.53 The Institute’s proposal was an 800 million yen project referred to
as “the big kerchief” because it covered so much of the city.54 The plans included
paving and widening the streets, expanding water, electrical, and gas services,
improving the harbor and waterways, building parks, schools, municipal buildings,
and public structures, and offering a wide variety of new social services for the
citizens of Tokyo.55 These plans ultimately proved cost prohibitive, however, and
Gōtō’s grand scheme never came to fruition.56
With the devastation of the Great Quake, Gōtō had the opportunity to rebuild
the city. However, his plans, at three times the amount of the national budget, were
again cost prohibitive.57 Because the economy of Tokyo was destroyed, Tokyo was
forced to rebuild largely with the same insufficient design as prior to the Great
Quake with “narrow streets, slum areas, open sewers, and many other urban
maladies.”58 With the introduction of Western-style apartments, despite the widespread destruction of the Great Quake, the city’s population continued to grow in the
1920s and 1930s.59
Nearly as soon as Tokyo began to recover from the devastation of the Great
Quake, Tokyo’s population was again devastated—this time by the U.S. bombing
campaigns of World War II. In the winter of 1944-45, the United States attacked
Tokyo over 100 times, again leading to the deaths of over 100,000 citizens.60 The
attacks culminated in March 1945 when, in the course of three hours, American
bombers dropped over 700,000 incendiary bombs on Tokyo, which alone killed
over 77,000 civilians and destroyed over 276,000 buildings,61 reducing most of the
post-earthquake reconstruction to ashes.62
51

Id. at 81.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 82.
57
Id.
58
Id. (citing Y. HAYASE, THE CAREER OF GŌTŌ SHINPEI: JAPAN’S STATESMEN OF RESEARCH, 18571929 (1974)).
59
The population of Tokyo grew from 2.2 million at the end of the Meiji period to 6.8 million at the
end of the 1930s. Wegener, supra note 46, at 93-95.
60
CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 83-84.
61
Id. at 84.
62
TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, A HUNDRED YEARS OF TOKYO CITY PLANNING 44 (1994)
[hereinafter A HUNDRED YEARS OF TOKYO CITY PLANNING].
52
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Tokyo’s Urban Recovery Focused Solely on Promoting Economic and
Industrial Growth

World War II marked the final great destruction of Tokyo and set the
stage for a great modern-day miracle of urban reconstruction and renewal.63
The end of the war was perhaps the single most important event in Tokyo’s
city planning history and can mark the beginning of the modern Tokyo urban
plan. 64 Unfortunately, the beginning of this era was characterized by a
desperate need to meet the short-term goal of redevelopment.65 The wartime
population of Tokyo dropped to 2.8 million, but after the war, citizens
returned to the city along with repatriates from Japan’s colonies and a large
number of rural immigrants. 66 Tokyo’s population ballooned to seven
million by 1955, making even the city’s large public housing programs
grossly inadequate. 67 Tokyo was forced to forsake grander goals of
modernization for more fundamental needs.68
Governance in Japan was controlled by a powerful iron triangle
composed of government, bureaucracy, and big business.69 The centralized
control of power, with blurred lines and members intermingling between all
three groups, created an environment that allowed for tremendous economic
growth and consistent promulgation of pro-business policies. 70 This left
little room for outside forces such as citizen groups or nonprofit
organizations to influence the governance of Japan.71 Practically speaking,
Tokyo’s post-war needs were two-fold: to house an unexpectedly growing
population and to achieve economic stability and independence.72 To meet
these goals, a hyper-centralized government was created with politicians,
bureaucracy, and big-business driving the goal of economic growth.73 The
result was a tremendous financial success that allowed Japan to catapult
itself into being one of the most economically successful powers in the
63

CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 86-87.
World War II provides a logical starting point for this discussion regarding Tokyo’s urban
development. For a thorough historical analysis of Tokyo and Japan’s development, see generally
CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23. See also RICHARD STORRY, A HISTORY OF MODERN JAPAN (rev. vol. 1983).
65
SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 152.
66
Wegener, supra note 46, at 95.
67
Id.
68
“Tokyo recovered rapidly from the devastation of the earthquake and the war but sacrificed longrange plans for the optimal functional use of the city.” Takashi Hirai, The Heart of Tokyo: Today’s Reality
and Tomorrow’s Vision, in JAPANESE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 26 (Gideon Golany, Keisuke Hanaki &
Osamu Koide eds., 1998)..
69
Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 589.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
A HUNDRED YEARS OF TOKYO CITY PLANNING, supra note 62, at 50-51.
73
Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 585.
64
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world. The cost of this success, however, was that citizens lacked any type
of participatory role in urban development decisions and Japan’s modern
culture was shaped by the single goal of economic growth.
III.

EARLY ATTEMPTS TO INCORPORATE CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT
TOKYO’S URBAN DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM WERE UNSUCCESSFUL

INTO

The first attempts to incorporate citizen involvement into urban
development realized only small victories. City planners recognized the
importance of having a livable city that met the citizens’ socio-cultural goals
long before the city’s modern urban development scheme. 74 Despite the
recognized importance of the socio-cultural goals, citizens accepted the fact
that housing and economic needs in post-war Tokyo trumped these goals.75
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, Tokyo’s citizens began to decry the
condition of Tokyo’s urban development.76 It is in this era that the citizens
began to press for an improved urban development system that incorporated
citizen involvement. The citizens ultimately realized some success,
including the passage of the City Planning Law of 1968 (“CPL”).77 After
the passage of the CPL, citizens continued to press for change at the polls
and in the courtroom. While the citizens were victorious at the polls and in a
few influential court decisions, 78 the success of their efforts was limited
because economic growth continued in Tokyo.79 This continued economic
growth allowed the iron triangle to block outside influences, including
citizen participation, from entering the political process.

74
See CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 81 (discussing Gōtō Shimpei’s lofty development plans prior to
the Great Kanto Earthquake).
75
See infra Part III.A.
76
See CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 200-03.
77
Toshi Keikaku Ho [City Planning Law], Law No. 100 of 1968, art. 33(14) [hereinafter CPL]. For
a thorough examination of the specific articles of the CPL, see generally Shibata 2003, supra note 28, at
154.
78
The most influential cases include: Judgment of June 30, 1971, Tôyama District Court, 635 Hanrei
Jihô 17, aff'd by Judgment of August 9, 1972, Nagoya High Court, 674 Hanrei Jihô 25 (Tôyama Itai-itai
disease case); Judgment of September 29, 1971, Niigata District Court (Niigata Minamata disease case);
Judgment of July 24, 1972, Tsu District Court (Yokkaichi Branch) 672 Hanrei Jihô 30 (Yokkaichi asthma
case); and Judgment of March 20, 1973, Kumamoto District Court, 696 Hanrei Jihô 15 (Kumamoto
Minamata disease case). These cases are discussed at length in JULIAN GRESSER, KOICHIRO FUJIKURA &
AKIO MORISHIMA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN 29-132 (1981).
79
See infra Part III.C.

340

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

A.

VOL. 15 NO. 1

The Creation of a Bottom-Up Approach to Urban Development Was
the First Attempt to Pierce the Iron Triangle

Translated generally as “community building” or “community
development,” machizukuri80 represents what planners in Japan believe to be
the “most hopeful development in Japanese planning in many years.”81 At
the root of machizukuri is the first attempt to pierce the iron triangle in the
1960s and 1970s and the organization of citizen groups in response to vast
environmental degradation and housing shortages caused by unchecked
industrial growth in Tokyo.82 While machizukuri began to see success in the
1960s, strong economic growth sustained an impenetrable political iron
triangle with the singular goal of economic growth blocking much of the
success of the early machizukuri movement.
The post-war industrialization and population growth of Tokyo was
marked by the emphasis of economic growth at the expense of adequate
housing needs and a livable urban environment. 83 Prime Minister Ikeda
Hayato justified the neglect of citizens’ needs, stating, “[w]e must first make
the pie bigger” – a reference to the need to build an economic and industrial
base before addressing other needs.84 This type of governance was possible
because of the unique relationship between the state and the citizens. 85
Where Western society “counter-poses” itself with the state, Japanese
society has been strongly integrated with and dependent on the state for its
very existence. 86 At the very backbone of Japanese government is the
centralization of power. While strongly centralized government is not
favored in Western culture, the Japanese dependence on the state for social
welfare stems from the success of the post-World War II governance.87
The centralized aspect of the government began to unravel when
citizens’ patience for improved conditions ended after the success of the
1964 Summer Olympics. The 1964 Summer Olympics in Tokyo symbolized
80

While the term machizukuri may have a far wider application, here the term will refer only to
bottom-up, citizen involvement in urban development projects.
81
SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 308.
82
See generally CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 93-97 (discussing Tokyo’s urban problems in the
1960s and 1970s).
83
SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 201-02.
84
CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 202.
85
SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 52. Government control stressed the duties instead of the rights of
citizens.
86
Stephen P. Osborne, The Voluntary and Non-Profit Sector in Contemporary Japan, in THE
VOLUNTARY AND NON-PROFIT SECTOR IN JAPAN 9 (Stephen P. Osborne ed., 2003) (citing Takayoshi
Amenomori, Japan, in DEFINING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A CROSS NATIONAL ANALYSIS 193 (Lester M
Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, eds. 1997).
87
Bothwell, supra note 34, at 123.
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Japan’s emergence as an independent state. 88 Although the Olympics
allowed the city to proceed with projects aimed at “presenting their city [to
the world] in the best possible light,” these projects unfortunately failed to
address the needs of Tokyo’s residential neighborhoods and left housing,
sewers, and recreational facilities woefully inadequate. 89
These
inadequacies came to a head when a “noisome plague of black flies
descended on the blue-collar wards.”90 The citizens took action at the polls,
voting the conservative municipal government out of office,91 and formed
loosely organized groups in order to protest the poor urban environment.92
The citizens’ movements of the 1960s had an “idealistic but
confrontational style,” which led to “deep-seated distrust” of the
organizations formed through the citizens’ movement.93 The groups were
largely anti-establishment and anti-American, which alienated them from a
large section of Japanese society.94 In contrast to the citizens movements,
corporations began to support organizations in the scientific and
technological fields. 95 The government viewed the corporate-sponsored
organizations as “a useful vehicle for stimulating the modernization process
of Japan” and accordingly offered these organizations beneficial tax
treatment.96 On the other hand, the citizen movement groups were viewed as
an impediment to the growth and modernization of Japan.97 This bifurcation
prevented a unified nonprofit field from emerging 98 and allowed the
government to maintain significant control over nonprofit organizations.
Despite the divided field, negative image, and strict government oversight,
informal citizen groups continued to propagate through the 1980s and
1990s.99

88

SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 191.
CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 201-02.
90
Id. at 202.
91
Id.
92
SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 210.
93
Takayoshi Amenomori, Japan, in DEFINING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A CROSS NATIONAL
ANALYSIS 193 (Lester M. Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier eds. 1997).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Bothwell, supra note 34, at 123.
89
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The City Planning Law of 1968 Codified the Requirement for Citizen
Consent in Urban Development Projects

Statutorily, citizen involvement in Tokyo’s urban development began
with the promulgation of the City Planning Law of 1968 (“CPL”).100 The
CPL was the first urban development instrument that included a citizen
consent provision and was also the first step toward decentralizing the urban
development scheme.101 The underlying concept of the CPL was:
To plan for the wholesome development and orderly growth of
cities by determining the factors necessary for city planning and
to contribute thereby to the promotion of the public welfare and
the balanced development of the national land.102
While the CPL citizen consent provision was the first step toward greater
citizen involvement, it provided only weak legal remedies for local
governments and citizens who sought to enforce the statutory
requirements.103
The two most important changes embodied in the CPL were that
it: 1) transferred planning power to the prefectural governors and
municipalities at the city, town, and village level; and, 2) allowed for citizen
participation.104 These changes were an effort to “enable every citizen to
lead a healthy, civilized existence and to ensure an adequate supply of city
services while recognizing that protecting one person’s property rights
sometimes requires restricting the private rights of others.”105 Recognizing
the importance of balanced and prioritized rights was ineffectual, however,
without the proper political and economical environment to allow for a
shifting balance of power.
Citizens and developers alike have decried the provisions of the CPL.
The citizen consent provision requires developers to notify citizens of
impending development actions that fit within tightly defined
characteristics. 106 Tokyo ordinances limit the notification and consent
requirements to those citizens residing within the radius equal to twice the
100

Toshi Keikaku Hō [City Planning Law], Law No. 100 of 1968; See also SORENSEN, supra note 16,

at 219.
101
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SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 219.
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height of the development project.107 One critic of the system noted that
while citizen movements centered on slogans like “the real leaders of
community building are the local people,” the real reason for the citizen
consent requirements was that “[leaders didn’t] want them to complain they
didn’t know about [the development].”108 The reason for much of the public
criticism was that the scope of consent required was so narrow that it did not
adequately capture the desire of the greater community. Furthermore, the
consent requirements were largely de facto in nature.109 Because consent
requirements are not judicially enforceable, 110 citizens cannot enforce
violations of the requirement and developers are unsure of the consequences
for failure to comply. National ministry circulars went so far as to note that
it would “not be appropriate” for local governments to require a developer to
“submit a form evidencing consent from all relevant parties.”111 Nonprofit
organizations can address these issues by providing more efficient
communication between developers and citizens. NPOs could also reach a
wider breadth of citizens, thus not limiting feedback to citizens statutorily
defined as “affected.”112
Developers also decry the citizen participation requirements as
inefficient and costly. They complain that considerable time and resources
are spent in the effort to acquire local citizen consent and that it requires
skillful “politicking” of local residents and bureaucrats. 113 The main
argument against the imposition of the de facto procedural requirement of
citizen consent is that the process is “a private process without public
oversight.” 114 It is “problematic because it arguably compromises due
process, the rule of law, and basic equity by vesting interest groups with de
facto veto authority over development applications.” 115 An effective
nonprofit sector would address this issue by balancing the bargaining power
107

Tokyo-To Chu Koso Kenchiku Butsu No Kenchiku Ni Kakaru Funso No Yobo To Chosei Ni Kan
Suru Jorei [Tokyo Metropolis Ordinance on Prevention of Disputes and Adjustments Related to Medium
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108
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of the developers and citizens, eliminating the need to require costly and
inefficient consent provisions.
The CPL has been criticized in two other main areas. First, the
procedural requirements of the CPL weaken the development system
economically. 116 They create inefficiency by hindering development
applications with slow processing times and duplicitous administrative
requirements. 117 Second, a lack of predictability created by the citizen
consent requirement reduces efficiency.
The bottom-line argument against citizen consent requirements for
development projects is the inefficiency of the process. This inefficiency
expresses itself in a number of ways. The requirement is inefficient for
developers because they face high costs associated with acquiring citizen
consent. It is also inefficient because it adds an element of unpredictability
to the development process. The citizen consent requirements also fail to
consider the inequity between citizens and developers. This inequity may
lead to developers simply purchasing citizens’ consent, which effectively
destroys the goal of the citizen consent requirement. Finally, the CPL citizen
consent requirement is inefficient because it fails to inform or capture the
consent of an adequate breadth of the community, emphasizing the interests
of micro-communities instead of the Tokyo community at large. The
development of a strong nonprofit sector could balance the bargaining power
between citizens and developers and eliminate these inefficiencies. This
balance would remove the need for statutory consent requirements.
C.

After the Passage of the City Planning Law, Citizens Remained Active
at the Polls and in the Courtroom

Citizens continued to take action at the polls after the passage of the
City Planning Law of 1968 by voting members of the long-serving
conservative municipal government of Tokyo out of office. 118 Minobe
Ryōkichi was elected governor of Tokyo after running as a government
skeptic who longed for the return of the habitable city environment that he
remembered as a boy.119 Minobe pledged taiwa (dialog) with citizens and
instituted a “civil minimum” policy that cracked down on Tokyo’s urban
maladies. 120 It was under this vision that the “Tokyo for the People”
116
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campaign was introduced in 1972.121 According to Governor Minobe, “[i]n
giving priority to Tokyo’s development as the economic and industrial hub
of the nation after World War II, the welfare of its citizens was forced to take
a back seat. Creating a good living environment was secondary.”122 While
the thrust of his campaign remains the impetus of today’s urban planning
schemes from the “My Town Tokyo” plan to the Long-Term Development
plans discussed below, 123 the goals of the plan remained largely unmet
because, despite the social ills of the society, Japan’s economic growth
continued.
In addition to taking action at the polls, citizens mobilized against the
government. Local governments received as many as 75,000 pollutionrelated complaints in 1971.124 Many of these complaints gained national
media attention and the movements began to see favorable court response to
the petitions.125 Despite the increased citizen mobilization, the tremendous
amount of energy put towards the movement resulted in relatively few
substantive results.126 Even with the limited success of these movements, it
has been noted that:
In the longer run, even though so many citizens’ movements
achieved little for their efforts, the cumulative impact of their
very numbers proved great, as this huge wave of local
opposition movements transformed Japanese politics, especially
at the local level, and led to an electoral crisis for the ruling
LDP government in the late 1960s and early 1970s.127
In short, the citizen movements of the 1960s and 1970s were a good start
toward effective citizen involvement, but were by no means the end of the
road for the movement.
While Tokyo’s goals have been identified and citizen involvement
began to enter the political process of Tokyo’s urban development in the
1960s and 1970s, the success of machizukuri was limited because of the
strong economic growth of Tokyo occurring at the same time.128 Between
121
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1972 and 1986, the number of employees in Tokyo grew from 6.7 million to
8.0 million, and the number of business establishments grew from 643,973
to 797,483.129 The strong and growing economic environment allowed big
business to remain closely allied with the bureaucracy and the legislature,
which effectively blocked outside interests from having any significant
influence on the governance of urban development.
IV.

SINCE THE EARLY 1970S, TOKYO HAS FORMULATED GOALS TO MEET
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL NEEDS OF ITS CITIZENS, BUT THESE GOALS
HAVE NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED TO DATE

As a result of early citizen participation movements, the Tokyo
Municipal Government began to openly express the goals for Tokyo urban
development. Although the socio-cultural goals of the city began to be
recognized and publicized, the city faced many impediments to actually
satisfying the lofty objectives expressed in the government publications.
A.

The Tokyo Government Formulated and Revised Its Goals for Urban
Development for Several Decades

In the 1970s, Tokyo’s city planners began to recognize that the tension
between the developers and the citizens was growing because citizen
interests had been neglected for decades. 130 Buildings were built and
demolished and roads opened without the knowledge of the citizens. The
town “that was once [the citizens’] own,” the drafters of the Second Long
Term Plan stressed, “change[d] to an ‘unknown town’ before they realized
what was happening.”131
Tokyo’s government recognized the need for well-planned
development. The city has also had unique, albeit tragic, opportunities to
revamp its city planning goals in order to meet the needs of its citizens.
However, several obstacles have prevented Tokyo from fully realizing its
objectives. Two of the main impediments in the past have been booming
population growth 132 and a dominating and unilateral need for economic
growth. 133 Today, with Japan being a dominant and stable world power,
Tokyo has the unique opportunity to, at last, successfully meet the dynamic
129
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and diverse needs of each of its interests—citizens, government, and
economy.
With a stabilized population, the Tokyo Municipal Government
(“TMG”) saw the need to redefine its redevelopment goals. The intent was
to change the urban development scheme from “demand-led” development
that is always trying to keep up with infrastructure development, to “policyled” urban development that satisfies objectives with the participation and
cooperation of various entities.134 The My Town Tokyo plan documented
the needs and desires of Tokyo in the publication City Planning of Tokyo,135
a precursor to the subsequent Long Term Plans.136 The basic goal was to
“create a safe and invigorating city that the citizens c[ould] call their
home.”137
The My Town Concept Council and the Tokyo Long Term Planning
Council launched the long-term planning scheme of Tokyo in the early
1980s. 138 The planning documents were updated first in 1986 (Second
Long-Term Plan) and again in 1990 (Third Long-Term Plan). 139 They
contain two main ideals: “a ‘basic concept’ that projects an image of Tokyo
as it should be in the twenty-first century, and a ‘10-year operating plan’ that
sets out specific projects for the TMG to pursue.” 140 These plans
demonstrate the vigor with which Tokyo has approached its land use
policy.141 The illustrative and concisely written documents are accessible to
the general public and signal that the TMG wants this plan to be well
received by each of its citizens.142 The accessibility of the documents also
serves as world-wide notice that Tokyo has set, and will continue striving to
meet, the wide range of its city’s needs.
134
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Together with the My Town Tokyo Plan, the Bureau of City Planning
in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government specifically listed five goals for
urban development in Tokyo. The Bureau of City Planning considers of
great importance:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Maintenance and development of economic dynamics
that ensure international competitiveness;
Coexistence with environment-enabling continuous
prosperity;
Creation and diffusion of original urban culture;
Realization of high-quality living environment in which
people can live safely and healthily;
Participation and cooperation of various entities
including metropolitan citizens, corporations, and NPO’s,
etc.143

While these priorities are extremely broad, they represent the basic goals of
Tokyo urban development and redevelopment in the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
B.

Tokyo’s Urban Development Goals Have Repeatedly Met with
Significant Challenges and Have Not Been Implemented

There are several factors that make land use policy particularly
important and challenging for Tokyo. Central to this challenge is the need to
balance the interests of a highly advanced and technical society with having
a livable city with cultural ideologies and traditions.144 The often conflicting
goals of economic growth and urban culture have left Tokyo with two
idealized images—a modern, highly advanced, and developed city that is
globally competitive in the business sector, and an image of a green, lightly
developed, extremely “livable” environment that allows for peace and
tranquility.145 While the cultural importance of land use planning is by no

143
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means unique to Japan, it is apparent that Japanese culture places great
importance on the environment in which they live, work and play.146
In addition to the dichotomy between economy and culture, Tokyo has
encountered and must plan for future natural and human disasters. Japan’s
history of tragic and devastating disasters has forced Tokyo to rebuild, nearly
from scratch, several times. These tragedies have, however, implanted
Tokyo with the feeling that the city is not a static entity, but rather, an ever
changing, evolving, and improving instrument of the people and
government.147 The history of destruction has also allowed the government
to gain significant power in a paternalistic sense. 148 Despite recognized
opportunities to meet the development needs of the city, however, Tokyo has
never fully met its socio-cultural goals. In the wake of the destruction of the
early twentieth century, citizens relied on the government to rebuild the city
and the government accomplished this task.149 It is precisely this history of
strong urban recovery and economic growth with highly centralized
governance that creates a challenge to decentralization and the introduction
of citizen participation. 150 Koshiro Ishida, the government minister
responsible for improving public access said: “We felt we had to catch up
with the West after the chaos left by the war and so did not pay attention to
rights. But that attitude has to change now.”151
Tokyo is also the capital city of the third largest national economy in
the world behind the United States and China.152 Beyond being the seat of
the national government,153 Tokyo is the financial and business capital154 as
well as the hub of popular culture in Japan.155 These roles put immense
146
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pressure on Tokyo to meet the many needs of its citizens.156 It also faces the
pressure of being a growing metropolis. 157 Tokyo’s ubiquitous appeal to
many different sections of the nation has created a sprawling city, pressed
for both space and infrastructure.158 These unique attributes of Tokyo make
its land use policies central to the continued success of Tokyo as a worldwide center of commerce, culture, and livability.
V.

THE EMERGING NONPROFIT SECTOR PRESENTS THE FIRST VIABLE
MEANS OF MEETING TOKYO’S URBAN DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The nonprofit sector that is beginning to develop under the NPO Law
of 1998 has the potential to overcome past impediments to citizen
participation in Tokyo’s urban development scheme. Citizen groups in
Tokyo have been attempting for decades to influence the city’s urban
development. Today’s political and economic environments have opened
the political structure of the government to allow participation by the
nonprofit sector. Along with this increased political openness, the nonprofit
sector has gained significant legitimacy both legally and in the opinion of
the general public. While the nonprofit sector has realized unprecedented
success, it still has significant strides to take before it is a truly viable
conduit to meaningful public participation. Tokyo’s current environment
provides a unique opportunity to take these strides and create a viable
nonprofit sector.
A.

Political and Economic Obstacles Have Prevented the Creation of a
Nonprofit Sector That Effectively Represents the Citizens of Tokyo

While the government has recognized the need for a viable sector
representing the needs of the citizens for decades, 159 there have been a
number of significant barriers to the establishment of such a sector. The
major challenges facing the development of a nonprofit sector are the role of
government, the source of funding, and the legitimacy of the nonprofit
sector.160
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Historically, the Japanese government has been a provider for its
citizens161 and the government’s desire to continue as provider is the first
major obstacle to the establishment of a strong nonprofit sector. Through
much of the twentieth century, citizens looked to the Japanese government to
provide them with necessities such as adequate housing and economic
security. The government capably met these needs. The current sociocultural needs of the citizens cannot, however, be provided by the
government, and the citizens and government alike have struggled to find
the appropriate provider of such services. As Japan’s governance shifted
away from the “Japan, Inc.” model of post-war Japan, 162 the relationship
between the Japanese government and its citizens has changed. Katsuji
Imata, President/CEO of Japan-US Community Education and Exchange,
discussed this change:
Bureaucrats won’t give up their territory. And the sad thing is
that they are not villains. They are not “control freaks.”
Rather, they are paternalistic. After all, they are the ones that
created the economic miracle in Japan’s postwar era by setting
policy priorities and focusing of the welfare of the corporate
sector . . . . They can’t see how the society will sustain itself if
they don’t play the fatherly role. As a result, people are
suffocated by the same-old uniform measures in different
social, economic and educational policies.163
The nonprofit sector is the appropriate mechanism to overcome this
challenge and meet the socio-cultural needs of citizens.
Underlying the Japanese system of governance is the basic public
understanding of what the public sector means. The preconceived notion in
Japan is that “public” means “government;” the idea that “public” may also
mean “citizen” is foreign to the citizens of Japan.164 The current nonprofit
sector in Japan is referred to as the “third sector.”165 The “third sector” is so
heavily influenced by the government and big business that the Japanese
term for the third sector, dai san sekuta, refers to a “hybrid sector of quasipublic, quasi-business organizations,” not an independent sector. 166 With
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this understanding, the NPOs are not seen as makers of public policy, but
rather as pawns merely serving the interests of the government.167
For the NPO sector to be successful, it must be truly independent from
the government and bureaucracy. If it remains significantly influenced by
the authoritarian government, it will not effectively influence society. 168
One way to describe the relationship between the government and nonprofit
sector is that of “patron-client,” where NPOs are seen as protected or
supported by the government.169 The close supervision of NPOs through the
relevant ministries demonstrates this relationship.170 NPOs are required to
register with the ministry or ministries that govern the subject matter of the
organization’s activities. 171 The ministry also has the discretion as to
whether or not it should grant an organization’s application for
incorporation.172 In 1999, one organization sought to incorporate with the
intention of providing support to Indonesia, but authorities denied its
application demanding that the organization change the recipient of its aid to
“developing nations.” 173 Such governmental controls over incorporation
significantly impede NPOs’ independence.
In addition to the close supervisory role that the government plays,
NPOs also rely heavily on government funding for their operations, which
further erodes organizational independence.174 Funding for NPOs can come
from numerous sources, including direct grants from government and
corporations, private donations, and membership fees. 175 Empirical
evidence demonstrates that the source of NPO revenue is divided as follows:
1.3% – private contributions; 38.3% – public sector payments, and 60.4% –
private fees and payments (which include primarily tuition to private
schools).176 The development and housing sector has a similar, but more
polarized division of revenue: 0.0% – private contributions; 24.4% – public
sector payments; and; 75.6% – private fees and payments. 177 The
government can maintain significant control over the nonprofit sector
167
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through this type of funding. By failing to provide adequate tax incentives
to individuals, the government is limiting private donations that would
strengthen the independence of the organizations.178
Donations to government entities are fully tax deductible for corporate
entities and are deductible for up to one-quarter of household income after a
¥10,000 threshold donation is made. 179 In contrast, donations to public
interest organizations are tax deductible for corporations only when there is
an “urgent [public] need.”180 Furthermore, donations are only tax deductible
if the organization has applied for and received special tax status from an
appropriate ministry.181 If the ministry does not support an organization, it
can simply deny the organization’s application for special tax treatment,
effectively limiting a substantially viable source of potential revenue. That
this procedural hurdle, however logical, is at the full discretion of the
relevant ministry, severely limits NPOs’ independence because only those
NPOs that reflect the interests of government receive funding.182
Corporate interests also create a major challenge to the viability of the
nonprofit sector because of the tenuous relationship they have with the
nonprofit sector. On one hand, the nonprofit sector relies heavily on the
corporate world for financial backing.183 On the other hand, the sector is
threatened by corporate influence in times of economic stagnation.184 NPOs
are threatened for two reasons when there is a weak economy. First, reduced
profit for corporate entities leads directly to reduced revenue for nonprofit
organizations.185 Second, corporate entities expect powerful government—a
threat to nonprofit independence in times of economic stagnation. 186
Importantly, however, both the economic and nonprofit sectors share a
common goal of economic growth. This common goal must be emphasized
in order to foster a relationship between the two sectors, thus avoiding a
sense of divisiveness. There is also strong evidence that increased social
capital leads to aggregate economic growth.187
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The legitimacy of nonprofit organizations is the final major obstacle
to the viability of the sector.188 In order to build strong NPOs, citizens must
understand the importance of the nonprofit sector and contribute to the
organizations.189 Currently, Japanese nonprofits have shallow support bases
with only a few NPOs having more than 1000 supporting members. 190
Support for Japanese nonprofit organizations is simply not a part of the
culture. 191 Even with NPO growth and development, only twenty-two
percent of adults with full-time jobs engage in charitable activities. 192
Without a strong base of citizen support, Tokyo will continue to struggle to
create a viable nonprofit sector. A leading scholar in the nonprofit field in
Japan, Yasuo Harima, states that “[citizens] must change [their] paradigm
from individualism to community-ism . . . . NPO’s are ‘community.’ Their
value is in their performance as community.” 193 The strength of the
nonprofit sector lies not with the strength of the organization’s officers, the
amount of government support, or the amount of local support alone, but
rather with each of these components working in unison towards a common
goal. 194
B.

Political and Economic Changes in the 1990s Allowed for the
Creation of the First Viable Framework for a Nonprofit Sector

The political and economic setting of the 1990s in Tokyo weakened
the rigid political system and allowed citizen interests to gain a foothold in
Tokyo’s governance. The bursting of the economic bubble in Japan, as well
as political scandal and the devastation of the Kobe Earthquake in 1995 led
to the promulgation of the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities of
1998 (“NPO Law”). 195 The NPO Law is the keystone of the current
framework for the nonprofit sector and its promulgation can provide the
momentum needed to build a more effective nonprofit sector.
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Japan’s economic downturn in the early 1990s set the stage for the
growth of the nonprofit sector. 196 The 1990s marked the end of Japan’s
inflated land market and brought Japan’s unprecedented history of economic
growth to an end. 197 The end of economic growth severely reduced the
finances of central and local governments and limited the government’s
ability to support programs such as “lifetime employment.”198 With fewer
governmental resources, the previously dominant political powers were
unable to appease competing interests, thus weakening the ubiquity of the
iron triangle.199
Corruption in the bureaucracy came to light in the wake of the
stagnant economy and further weakened the political iron triangle.200 While
corruption was nothing new to Japan, citizens forced accountability onto the
politicians after the economic collapse.201 The corruption led to a political
shakeup and ultimately to the Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) losing
power in 1993 for the first time since 1955.202 This shakeup allowed for
electoral reforms, which were expected to reduce the LDP’s power and
allow for other parties to gain more influence over the legislature.203
Finally, the Kobe Earthquake of 1995 brought significant changes to
the role of the nonprofit sector. 204 The inadequacy of the government
response to the Kobe Earthquake brought poor bureaucratic governance into
the public’s view, while concomitantly highlighting the efficiency of nongovernmental organizations and the voluntary response of citizens.205 The
bureaucratic response has been described as, “ministries jealously guard[ing]
their bailiwicks” and sectionalism that “inhibit[ed] cooperation or effective
action.”206 Importantly, however, the Kobe Earthquake was not the catalyst
that began the volunteer activity. Rather, it allowed for widespread
recognition of the preexisting voluntary and nonprofit sector.207 Volunteer
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groups began in earnest in the late 1980s alongside the growing prominence
of the corporate citizenship movement.208
Along with the Kobe Earthquake, the media was vitally important to
the growth of the nonprofit sector. The media generally has three effects on
the policy making process: “1) identifying issues and setting the agenda for
policymakers, 2) influencing attitudes and values toward policy issues, and
3) changing the behavior of voters and decision makers.”209 Media attention
to the voluntary response to the Kobe Earthquake is a prime example of how
the media influenced each of these areas and forced the promulgation of the
NPO Law.210
The purpose of the NPO Law is to promote the development of
nonprofit activities.211 In order to achieve this goal, the NPO Law provides
incorporated status to NPOs and makes tax exempt status available to the
organizations. Although the NPO Law does not remove NPOs from
ministerial supervision,212 it allows citizen-led activities to proceed with less
government intrusion.213 The burst of the economic bubble in Japan was
marked by political scandals and wide-scale skepticism of bureaucratic
competency. 214 Many of the scandals either involved fraudulent dealings
directly between politicians and NPO officials,215 or led to the demand for
government accountability for misdealings with NPOs. 216 At the time of
these scandals, it was nearly impossible for NPOs to incorporate as legal
entities and many NPOs felt that legal incorporation was the best means to
improving political strength and legitimacy. 217 Although the Japanese
Constitution provides for freedom of association,218 the Civil Code allows
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only a limited number of groups to gain status as a legal entity.219 Prior to
the NPO Law, the first obstacle to forming a legal corporation was that the
group had to act in the public interest.220 The second obstacle was that the
recognition of a group was at the “discretion of the competent ministry.”221
Specifically, NPOs felt that incorporation would allow the groups to: 1)
improve public credibility, 2) increase the ability to qualify for public
donations, 3) demonstrate that the group does not seek to make a profit, and
4) allow for more favorable tax treatment.222
The NPO Law has, however, been criticized as being an inadequate
means of achieving increased NPO legitimacy. The first weakness in the
NPO Law is that instead of amending the Civil Code, which provides the
general law for the incorporation of NPOs, the NPO Law is a “special law”
contained within the Code.223 The NPO Law requires that an organization fit
within one of seventeen exclusive categories provided within the statute.224
Most troublesome about the required categorization is that the prefectural
government is responsible for deciding whether or not an organization fits
within one of the categories. This type of bureaucratic control over the
nonprofit sector limits its effectiveness.
The fact that the economy has slowed, 225 the LDP’s power has
weakened,226 and there is a general acknowledgment of the need to improve
the urban environment with an eye towards meeting the socio-cultural needs
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of the citizens makes today a unique time ripe for the development of a
nonprofit sector.227
C.

Tokyo Can Realize a Successful Nonprofit Sector by Improving the
Sector’s Legitimacy and Independence

The Japanese government gave the nonprofit sector the framework to
enter Japanese governance through the NPO Law, but now there are a
number of steps that are essential to maintaining a politically salient
nonprofit sector. The nonprofit sector must meet several objectives that are
closely interrelated in order to implement a successful nonprofit sector. The
nonprofit sector must improve its legitimacy and independence. These
elements are closely related and without the growth of each element the
nonprofit sector will not be effective.
The first goal of the nonprofit sector should be to build legitimacy.
Legitimacy is an issue that nonprofit organizations must deal with regardless
of the strength of the nonprofit sector. In the United States, organizations
must continuously monitor their operations in order to maintain
legitimacy.228 Japan has an even more challenging task, having to build the
legitimacy of the sector from scratch. The first step toward building
legitimacy should be for nonprofit organizations to act locally; this is
particularly true in the field of urban development.
Urban development issues are acutely local—for example, zoning
laws can affect people in a block-by-block manner and transportation
decisions can have specific and drastic effects on a particular neighborhood.
For this reason, gaining local recognition should be the primary goal for
NPOs seeking public participation in the urban planning field. Hideaki
Uemura, chair of the Citizens’ Diplomatic Center for the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, addressed the importance of the involvement of local
citizens, stating: “As the concrete assignment . . . we have to make sure that
NPO activities benefit local people as much as possible.”229 Local people
would support NPOs if there were local benefits. 230 This means that
organizations must work at the grassroots level in order to build local
support and recognition. Today, Japanese citizens largely do not know what
227
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the nonprofit sector is capable of or what it aims to achieve.231 Building
legitimacy must also start with community outreach. Outreach should
include introducing children to community service activities and community
involvement, encouraging such activity at a young age. Without building the
legitimacy of the sector, the next two goals of the nonprofit sector will be
impossible.
Building a strong financial base is a critical goal for nonprofit
organizations, largely because without a viable financial base, independent
from governmental funding, nonprofit organizations remain susceptible to
government control. In essence, government funds become the “tail that
wags the dog.” 232 Article 89 of the Japanese Constitution states that
government funding cannot be distributed to organizations that are not under
the influence of a government agency. 233 Therefore, when nonprofit
organizations receive government funding, they must also agree to abide by
government regulations. 234 This defeats the purpose of having an
independent nonprofit sector representing the needs and interests of the
citizens. It is vital that the nonprofit sector act independently from the state.
A successful sector is one that “exists over and against the state, in partial
independence from it, . . . a web of autonomous associations, independent of
the state.” 235 This leaves nonprofit organizations in a serious quandary:
receive government funds and sacrifice independence, or reject government
funding and rely on prohibitively scarce alternative funding sources. The
only other potentially viable source of funding is through corporate support,
which also fails to solve the issue of NPO independence. This financial
dilemma demonstrates the strong need for private support of nonprofit
organizations and legal reform to allow for more flexible use of government
funds.
The financial dilemma also suggests that there is a need for tax reform
to stimulate and encourage charitable contributions from individuals and
corporations. The justification for such tax reform was well stated by the
United States Supreme Court:
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The exemption from taxation of money and property devoted to
charitable and other purposes is based on the theory that the
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met
by appropriations from other public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.236
The Japanese government must be willing and able to support the nonprofit
sector without encroaching on its independence. There is strong evidence
that balancing power between the public (government), private
(entrepreneurial) and civil (nonprofit) sectors is vital to a stable
government.237 The success of the nonprofit sector will help balance the
control of power in Japanese urban development.
The final critical element to the success of the nonprofit sector is the
development of a strong institutional infrastructure. 238
A strong
infrastructure includes having adequately trained and competent officers and
managers within the nonprofit organizations. 239 Jerry Inman, former
representative of the Asia Foundation in Tokyo, states that development of
this infrastructure is “essential and precedes NPOs being taken seriously by
the Japanese government and corporate sector and, maybe more importantly,
by their international NPO colleagues.”240 It is at this point that a vicious
cycle is created: 241 NPOs lack the financial means to attract trained
professionals, which reduces the sector’s ability to attract funding. 242
Increased training in public policy and administration, particularly in regard
to the nonprofit sector, may supply the sector with more adequate human
resources. Not only must there be professionals trained generally in
nonprofit management, there must be city planners who understand how to
operate a successful NPO. Such training may also create positive
externalities by increasing the legitimacy of the nonprofit sector and
improving the public’s knowledge of how the sector operates. Historically,
there has been a high level of prestige attached to entering the civil
service.243 In order to draw upon the top graduates from the University of
236
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Tokyo and other leading academic institutions, the nonprofit sector must
gain legitimacy.
While the nonprofit sector faces an uphill battle to overcome these
challenges, there is significant momentum in favor of the nonprofit sector.244
It is important that pressure is maintained on the government to continue
passing favorable legislation that will allow the sector to reach its potential.
The most important area of support for the nonprofit sector related to urban
development is from the local government. Local government maintains
significant control of development permitting. 245 Therefore, without the
support of the local government, NPOs will not have the momentum needed
to impact urban developers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The recently developed framework for a nonprofit sector in Japan
represents the first viable opportunity to incorporate the interests of the
citizens of Tokyo into the city’s urban development scheme. The NPO Law
is the backbone of this framework. Continued support of this statute,
together with government, corporate, and citizen support of nonprofit
organizations will allow the nonprofit sector to blossom into a politically
salient entity capable of balancing the urban development interests of the
government, corporations, and citizens. The growth of the nonprofit sector
will leverage citizens’ ability to affect positive social policy in Tokyo’s
continued urban development. This growth is especially important in light
of the conflict between the Tokyo citizens’ sense of place and Japan’s
centralized legal structure. Without an adequate nonprofit sector, the urban
environment will continue to be shaped by economic forces, as opposed to
citizen participation.
Development projects such as the Kunitachi
condominium case continue today. Without the development of a strong
nonprofit sector, citizens will be unable to influence the growth and
development of their own urban environment.
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